The effect of signalling and beliefs on the voluntary provision of public goods by Berlemann, Michael
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Berlemann, Michael
Working Paper
The effect of signalling and beliefs on
the voluntary provision of public goods
Dresden discussion paper in economics, No. 10/03
Provided in cooperation with:
Technische Universität Dresden
Suggested citation: Berlemann, Michael (2003) : The effect of signalling and beliefs on the
voluntary provision of public goods, Dresden discussion paper in economics, No. 10/03, http://
hdl.handle.net/10419/48147Dresden University of Technology 







 Dresden Discussion Paper Series  







The Effect of Signalling and Beliefs 
on the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods 

























ISSN 0945-4829  




Dresden University of Technology, 






































Faculty of Business Management and Economics, Department of Economics 
 
Internet: 
An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded from the homepage: 
http://rcswww.urz.tu-dresden.de/wpeconomics/index.htm 




Working paper coordinators: 
Michael Berlemann 
Oliver Greßmann 
e-mail: wpeconomics@mailbox.tu-dresden.de  
 
 








The Effect of Signalling and Beliefs 
on the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods 





Dresden University of Technology 
Faculty of Business Management and Economics 







We report and analyze the results of a series of classroom experiments on the voluntary provision of public goods. 
Using fixed effect panel regression models we find that cooperation significantly increases when participants are forced 
to guess the degree of overall cooperation. We also find that the possibility to make announcements during the 
experiment enhances cooperation significantly although these commitments are not binding and heavily used for 
cheating purposes. We suggest that this effect is due to attempts at restoring the announcements’ reputation in the 
aftermath of heavy cheating. 
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1 Introduction 
A pure public good is characterized by non-rivalry in consumption and the impossibility or 
inefficiency of excluding others from its consumption, once it has been supplied. Standard 
public finance theory suggests that, due to the non-excludability property, a pure public good 
will not be privately supplied since it is rational to make use of the free-rider option. The 
correction of this sort of market failure is one of the basic normative justifications for 
government activity. However, some doubts have been raised in how far the supply of public 
goods by the government is an optimal solution. It is well known that bureaucracies are 
subject to x-inefficiencies. Besides, it is far from being easy to uncover the public’s 
preferences on the optimal supply of public goods. Even if various methods of revealing the 
public’s preferences have been proposed and discussed, most of them are quite complicated to 
implement in practice. 
When experimental economics started to evolve in the early 1980’s the standard theory of 
public goods got subject to experimental studies, soon. Early studies on public good 
experiments found that people exhibit significant patterns of cooperative behaviour thereby 
contradicting standard theory. This initiated extensive research on the determinants of 
cooperation in public good experiments, which is partly theoretical and partly experimental in 
nature. Several motives for cooperation have been proposed and discussed.
1  
In the light of the experimental results the question is raised in how far the pessimistic view of 
standard theory according to which public goods will not be supplied on a private basis, holds 
true. Considerable attempts have been made to investigate by which means cooperation can 
                                                 
1  Among the motives that have been discussed are different forms of altruism (Andreoni (1993), Andreoni and 
Miller (1995)), the relative payoff position of individuals (Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels 
(2000)), cooperative gain seeking (Brandts and Schram (1996)) and different forms of reciprocity (Rabin (1993), 
Falk and Fischbacher (2000)). 
   3
be enhanced (for a survey see Ledyard (1995)). This paper aims at contributing to these 
efforts.  
We report the results of a series of classroom experiments on public goods run at Dresden 
University of Technology in spring 2002. On the one hand we analyze in how far individual 
expectations of cooperative behaviour of other participants determine individual and 
collective cooperative behaviour. Our results indicate that one motive guiding individual 
behaviour is reciprocity and that the advice to make guesses at others’ behaviour itself 
increases cooperation. On the other hand we study cooperative behaviour under a strictly 
limited form of communication during the experiment. Our results indicate that cooperative 
behaviour can be increased by introducing a non-binding signalling mechanism. Interestingly 
enough this holds true although the signalling mechanism is often used for cheating purposes.  
 
2 Basic design of the experiments 
As indicated earlier, we report results from 6 classroom experiments run at Dresden 
University of Technology in spring 2002. The total number of participants was 30, most of 
which were undergraduate students of economics. None of the participants had taken part in 
an economic experiment before. Participants were randomly assigned to 6 groups of 5. In 
each single session 5 participants played a public good game over 10 rounds. Altogether we 
ran 3 different treatments with one repetition per treatment.  
Upon arrival, the participants were placed at different desks in one room without the 
possibility to observe the others’ actions. Any form of communication during the 
experimental session was made impossible. At the beginning of the session each participant 
obtained a written instruction. All participants were asked to read through the instructions 
carefully. Afterwards, each participant had the possibility to ask questions. These were   4
answered privately by the experimenter. During the experiment no additional questions were 
answered.  
The experiment was not computerized. Whenever the participants had to act, for instance 
when reveal their strategies for a certain round, they had to fill out prepared forms which were 
collected by the experimenter after completion. The participants also had the possibility of 
writing down the history of the game for their own information. The participants were paid 
directly after the sessions in cash. The average payoff was 6.08 Euro (more detailed 
information on the payoffs are given in table 1). No session lasted longer than 30 minutes. 
  Treatment 1  Treatment 2  Treatment 3  All treatments 
Average  payoff  5.39 5.86 6.98 6.08 
Minimum  payoff  3.66 4.98 5.50 3.66 
Maximum  payoff  6.26 7.26 9.64 9.64 
Standard  deviation  0.77 0.73 1,23 1.13 
Table 1: Payoffs 
 
The basic setup of all treatments was as follows: in each of the ten rounds the participants 
obtained an endowment of 10 tokens that could be either invested in a private or a public 
good. Each token invested in the private good yielded a private payoff of 4 Cent. Each token 
invested in the public good led to a payoff of 2 Cent for all 5 participants involved in the 
session. Thus, the individual payoff of participant i in round r was 














r , i x and 
pub
r , i x being the tokens participant i invested in the private respectively the 
public good. This payoff structure ensures that free-riding, i.e.  0 xpub
r , i =  for all r, is the   5
unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game. However, the Nash equilibrium leads 
to a Pareto-inferior payoff structure
2 since all participants would be better off when investing 
all tokens in the public good in every single round.
3 
 
3 The standard experiment as reference scenario 
In his survey of the evidence of standard public goods experiments Ledyard (1995:121) 
reports some stylized facts on players’ behaviour. Two of the most important findings are 
that: 
•  In one-shot as well as in the first rounds of finitely repeated public good experiments 
participants tend to invest more than the individually optimal but less than Pareto-
efficient in the public good.  
•  Contributions to the public good decline in the course of repeated games. Often the 
investments into the public good decline sharply in the last round of the experiment 
(“last round effect”). Even in the last round the investments in the public good are 
significantly different from zero. 
Treatment 1, which reproduces the standard public good experiment, is intended to serve as a 
reference scenario. In order to be suitable in this respect the two sessions of treatment 1 
should coincide with these stylized facts. 
Figure 1 illustrates the development of aggregate investments in the public good in the two 
sessions of treatment 1. In both sessions there is a significant amount of cooperation. 
However, the degree of cooperation varies: participants in session 1 turned out to be more 
cooperative than those in session 2. Moreover, contributions to the public good seem to 
                                                 
2  Given that all players behaved like free-riders during the experiment the individual payoff for every participant 
would have been 4 Euro. 
3  In that case the individual payoffs would have been 10 Euros.   6




























































Treatment 1 Session 1 Treatment 1 Session 2 Treatment 1 Sum
 
Figure 1: Aggregate investments in public good in treatment 1 
However, in order to detect regularities in the data and study individual investment behaviour 
we have to apply appropriate empirical methods. Aggregating individual behaviour like in 
figure 1 has the advantage that common trends are easier to detect when not applying formal 
econometric or statistical methods. However, aggregation of individual behaviour is 
obviously inappropriate when studying individual investment behaviour. Since we focus on 
individual investment behaviour in this paper we use panel regression methods to evaluate the 
data from our experiments. Most theories trying to explain cooperative behaviour postulate 
the existence of different types of individuals (Brosig (2002): 276). It is thus highly 
questionable whether panel regressions with common intercepts are appropriate to make 
inferences on individual behaviour. These regressions typically have low explanatory power.
4 
                                                 
4  See e.g.  the study by Wilson and Sell (1997).   7
We therefore apply fixed effects models to the data allowing for an individual intercept for 
every single player rather than a common intercept.
5 
In order to test for a round trend in the data we run the following fixed effects panel 
regression (OLS method): 
r , i i
pub
r , i r x ε β α + ⋅ + = . 
The results, which are reported in table 2, indicate a significant round trend in treatment 1. 
Thus, the participants in treatment 1 significantly decreased their investment in the public 
good in the course of the game.  
Β -0.16 
T-value -2.05 
Significance  p < 0.05 
r
2 0.38 
Table 2: Round trend in treatment 1 
We also tested for a last round effect by comparing the investments in round 10 with the 
investments in the rounds before. Since investments in treatment 1 turned out to be not 
normally distributed
6 non-parametric methods have to be applied to test for a last round effect. 
While the average investment in round 10 was 0.8 smaller than the average investments in 
rounds 1-9 (1.6 and 2.4) a Mann-Whitney rank-sum-test reveals that this difference is 
insignificant at the 90-percent-confidence level.
7 
                                                 
5 Due to our relatively scarce number of observations per treatment we do no run random effects models like it is 
done e.g. in Neugebauer and Perote (2002). 
6 A Kolmogorov-Smirnov-test reveals that the hypothesis of normally distributed individual investments has to 
be rejected for all three treatments. Compare table A2 in the appendix for test-details. 
7 The statistics for tests on last round effects are provided in table A1 in the appendix.   8
All in all, we think that treatment 1 reproduces the stylized facts of standard public good 
experiments mentioned earlier quite well. Thus, usage of the results of treatment 1 as 
reference scenario seems to be appropriate. 
 
4 Expectations on cooperative behaviour 
In treatment 2 we changed the design of the standard experiment (treatment 1) only slightly. 
All participants were asked in every single round to guess how many tokens the group would 
invest into the public good before they had to decide on their own investment. However, the 
results of the individual guesses were neither communicated among the participants nor had it 
an influence on the participants’ payoffs.
8 We should therefore expect that the incentives and 
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Figure 2: Aggregate investments in public good in treatment 2 
                                                 
8 In some studies participants were paid according to the accuracy of their guesses (see e.g. Neugebauer and 
Perote (2002)).   9
Figure 2 illustrates the development of investments in the public good in the two sessions of 
treatment 2. Again, in both sessions the participants showed a considerable degree of 
cooperation. While aggregate investments in the public good seem to display a tendency 
towards decreasing in session 1, the opposite is true for session 2. When adding the 
investments of both groups any trend seems to diminish. In order to test for a round trend we 
again run a fixed effects panel regression. The results presented in table 3 indicate that there is 
no round trend in treatment 2. Thus, we find a contradiction to the standard public good 
experiment in which decreasing degrees of cooperation during experimental sessions have 
been observed. While the average contribution in the last round (2.80) is smaller than the 
average investment the 9 rounds before (3.13), we again find this last-round effect to be 




Significance  p > 0.10 
r
2 0.41 
Table 3: Round trend in treatment 2 
In addition, the participants in treatment 2 seem to show a generally higher level of 
cooperation, especially during the last 5 rounds of the game. While the average contribution 
to the public good in treatment 1 was 2.32, the participants in treatment 2 invested on average 
3.10 tokens in the public good. A Mann-Whitney rank-sum-test reveals that the observed 
difference in investments is significant at the 95-percent-confidence-level.
10 
Both empirical findings are somewhat surprising, since both treatments differ only in one 
respect: the participants were asked to guess how much the members of the group would 
                                                 
9 For detailed results see table A1 in the appendix. 
10 The complete test statistics are reported in table A3 in the appendix.   10
contribute to the public good before they had to make their investment decisions. Since the 
accuracy of individual guesses had no influence on the payoff, the incentive structure should 
be the same as in treatment 1 and thus should not induce different behaviour. However, the 
data suggests that the simple advice to guess how much the other participants will invest in 
the public good increases cooperative behaviour. 
In order to learn something about participants’ predictive abilities we analyze the accuracy of 
their guesses of the group’s cooperative behaviour. In figure 3 we show the empirical 
distribution of participants’ expectation errors. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov-test reveals that 
expectation errors are normally distributed (µ=0.04, σ=6.48). Using a t-test we have to reject 
the hypothesis that the mean of the empirical distribution is different from zero (t=-0.062). On 
average, the participants made an expectation error of 4.7 tokens. 
expectation - actual aggregate investment








Figure 3: Empirical distribution of expectation errors in treatment 2 
Earlier experimental studies often found that comparatively cooperative participants expect 
significantly more cooperation than defectors (Ledyard (1995):163). This might happen as the   11
result of a false consensus effect, stating that there is a tendency to overestimate one’s 
individual beliefs to be representative of the population.
11 We tested for this hypothesis by 
analyzing the correlation between the average investment in the public good 
pub
i x  (as a proxy 
for cooperativeness) and average expected cooperation  i g  respectively the average 
expectation error  i e  per participant (compare table 4). The correlation coefficients are both 
positive, considerably above 0.5 and significant at a 95-percent-confidence level. Hence, the 
hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
Variables Correlation  coefficient  (Pearson)  Significance (double sided) 
i
pub
i e , x   0.671 p<0.05 
i
pub
i g , x   0.714 p<0.05 
Table 4: Cooperativeness and expectations 
According to Frank (1987) cooperative individuals should be able to be generally better at 
predicting the cooperativeness of others than non-cooperative ones. He argues that the costs 
resulting from developing the ability to scrutinize others are born only by those individuals, 
who might profit from that, i.e. cooperative participants. Again we try to verify this 
hypothesis via a correlation analysis. However, while we find cooperativeness, again 
measured by average contributions to the public good, to be negatively correlated to the sum 
of absolute errors (SAE) and to the sum of squared errors (SSE), the correlation coefficients 
are quite low and insignificant (compare table 5). We thus have to reject the hypothesis that 
cooperative individuals are better in predicting the group’s cooperative behaviour than non-
cooperative ones. 
                                                 
11 See e.g. Forsythe et al. (1992), pp. 1154-1156.   12
 
Variables Correlation  coefficient 
(Pearson) 
Significance 
 (double sided) 
SAE , x
pub
i   -0.142 p>0.10 
SSE , x
pub
i   -0.235 p>0.10 
Table 5: Cooperativeness and accuracy of expectations 
A possible explanation for the generally increased level of cooperation in treatment 2 (in 
comparison with treatment 1) might be that the need of revealing a formal prediction of   
others’ behaviour induced the participants to care more about others’ strategies. In this case 
we should be able to detect a systematic relation between individual behaviour and guesses. A 
reasonable hypothesis might be that individual willingness to cooperate is positively 
correlated to the expected cooperative behaviour of other participants as measured by 
individual guesses of the groups’ contributions (see e.g. Croson (1998) or Neugebauer and 
Perote (2002)). An acceptance of this hypothesis indicates some form of reciprocal behaviour 






r , i 5
g
x ε γ α + ⋅ + = , 
with gi,r being participant i’s guess of the group’s aggregate investment in the public good in 
round r. The regression results are reported in table 6. The results indicate that individual 
investments are in fact driven by reciprocity, measured by the expected average group 
investment, thereby corroborating the findings of Croson (1998) and Neugebauer and Perote 
(2002). 
   13
γ 0.897 
T-value 6.91 
Significance  p < 0.01 
r
2 0.613 
Table 6: Individual investments and expectations 
One might also expect that participants’ willingness to cooperate is related to the accuracy of 
their guesses regarding other participants’ cooperative behaviour. To test for this hypothesis 
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g








− ⋅ + ⋅ + = ∑
=
− − . 
Since the accuracy of individual guesses can be judged not before the round is finished, the 
judgement error enters the regression equation with a one-round lag.  
γ 0.98 
T-value 5.95 
Significance  p < 0.01 
λ 0.10 
T-value 3.46 
Significance  p < 0.01 
r
2 0.638 
Table 7: Individual investments, expectations and expectation errors 
The results reported in table 7 show that lagged individual prediction errors are positively 
correlated to individual investments in the public good. An F-Test shows that the predictive 
power of the latter model is significantly improved by the inclusion of individual prediction 
errors (F
crit=6.93, F=20.21). Thus, the participants reacted to a surprisingly low level of   14
cooperation by increasing individual contributions to the public good. Whenever the 




Evolutionary game theorists have recently argued that cooperative behaviour can hardly 
survive in repeated games when there is no information on the opponents or their behaviour. 
However, if there are possibilities of signalling, cooperative strategies might survive the 
contest of strategies (Amann and Yang (1998)). 
A lot of research has been done on the effect of communication on cooperative behaviour in 
public good experiments. Yet it is still not well-understood.
12 In the experiments conducted by 
Isaak, McCue and Plott (1985), Isaak and Walker (1988) and Brosig, Ockenfels and Weimann 
(2002) pre-experimental communication increased cooperative behaviour – at least if 
participants were permitted to talk about the game explicitly. Brosig, Ockenfels and Weimann 
(2002) recently showed that the success of coordination efforts significantly depends on 
communication media. Wilson and Sell (1997) studied the effect of a certain type of 
signalling mechanism. In every round the participants who had no visual contact during the 
experiment, were asked to make non-binding announcements on their contribution to the 
public good. Before the final investment decision had to be made all individual 
announcements as well as the average announcement were communicated to the participants. 
After the investment decisions had been made, the participants were told in how far other 
participants sticked to their announcements. While the participants had no direct possibility of 
communicating, they could use the announcements as signalling devices of cooperative 
behaviour. Wilson and Sell (1997) observed that the overall degree of cooperation increased 
                                                 
12  Brosig, Ockenfels and Weimann (2002), p. 1.   15
in comparison to the case in which no signalling mechanism was available; yet the trend of 
diminishing cooperation over time did not diminish. The observation that the participants 
often used the signalling mechanism to overstate their cooperative behaviour (in 53.4 percent 
of all cases the participants announced to invest more in the public good than they actually 
did) made them believe that the signalling mechanism was primarily used for cheating 
purposes and prevented an even larger degree of cooperation.  
Our treatment 3 partially mimics the setting of Wilson and Sell (1997). As in their setting 
participants in treatment 3 were asked to announce how much tokens they were willing to 
invest in the next round of the experiment before they had to make their investment decision. 
However, only the aggregate of announcements was communicated to the participants. Also 
different from Wilson and Sell (1997), the participants in treatment 3 had no information on 
individual investment decisions.
13 
While game theory predicts that a non-binding announcement in a finitely repeated game is 
nothing else but “cheap talk” and should therefore have no influence on the participants’ 
behaviour, social psychology is more optimistic in this respect (see Wilson and Sell (1997), 
Orbell, van de Kragt and Dawes (1990) or Majewski and Fricks (1995)). The basic line of 
argument is that the possibility of monitoring the honesty of announcements will urge the 
actors to match their signals. Thus, signals of cooperation will be reinforced and should 
induce more contributions to the public good. 
Figure 4 illustrates the development of investments in the public good in the two sessions of 
treatment 3. As in treatments 1 and 2, in both sessions of treatment 3 the participants show a 
considerable degree of cooperation. The average contribution to the public good in treatment 
                                                 
13  There is a number of additional differences between the institutional setting in Wilson and Sell (1997) and 
treatment 3. The settings differ in aspects like the number of repetitions (18/10), organization 
(computerized/manual) and marginal per capita returns.   16
3 is 4.97 tokens. Thus, the participants on average contributed almost half of their 
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Figure 4: Aggregate investments in public good in treatment 3 
Figure 4 suggests that the participants in treatment 3 were more cooperative than those in 
treatments 1 and 2. Using a Mann-Whitney rank-sum-test, the hypotheses that the average 
contribution to the public good was highest in treatment 3 can not be rejected at a 99-percent-
confidence-level (see table 8). This basic finding is in line with Wilson’s and Sell’s (1997) 
results. 






Mean 2.32  3.10  4.97 
significance mean(T3)>(T1)  p < 0.01 
significance mean(T3)>(T2)  p < 0.01 
Table 8: Average contribution to public good in treatment 3   17
However, our results differ considerably from Wilson’s and Sell’s (1997) with respect to the 
observed pattern of cooperation during the experiment. While aggregate investment patterns 
in the two sessions of treatment 3 are quite similar they show no general round trend, although 
cooperative behaviour decreased throughout the last three rounds. Again we apply a formal 
test by running a fixed effects panel regression. The results, which are reported in table 9, 
indicate that there is no significant round trend. As in treatments 1 and 2 we find the average 
investment in the last round (3.90) to be smaller than the average investment in the 9 rounds 
before (5.09); however a Mann-Whitney rank-sum-test reveals that this difference is 




Significance  p > 0.10 
r
2 0.49 
Table 9: Round trend in treatment 3 
Altogether we conclude that although the announcements of the participants were not binding 
they enabled some form of communication among the participants and contributed to a 
significant increase in cooperation. While there was no possibility for the participants to 
check in how far individuals cheated by not fulfilling their announcements (different from the 
setting in Wilson and Sell (1997)), the overall degree of honesty was revealed after every 
round. As in Wilson and Sell (1997) the participants often used the possibility to make non-
binding announcements to cheat other participants. On average, the participants overstated 
their true investment in the public good by 2.76 tokens. As figure 5 reveals, the participants 
differed considerable in their treatment of the possibility of cheating.  
                                                 





















































Figure 5: Overstatement of investment in public good per participant 
Disaggregated data is presented in table 10 and figure 6. Only one out of 10 participants 
sticked to his announcements in all of the ten rounds. All others made use of the cheating 
option at least twice. However, none of the participants cheated in every round. Altogether, in 
slightly more than half of all cases (51 percent) the announcements turned out to be 
overstated. In one third of the observations the participants fulfilled their announcements. 
However, the observation could be made that there is a considerable number of observations 
of participants investing more in the public good than previously announced (16 percent).
15 
 
                                                 
15  Interestingly enough, these numbers match the findings of Wilson and Sell (1997) quite good. They report a 
share of 53.4% overstatements and 27.8% of honest announcements.   19
 
Participant Overstatement Honest  statement  Understatement 
21 5  1  4 
22 3  3  4 
23 0  10  0 
24 8  2  0 
25 5  3  2 
26 9  1  0 
27 6  2  2 
28 6  3  1 
29 7  3  0 
30 2  5  3 
All 51  33  16 
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Figure 6: Range of over- and understatements   20
Although the participants cheated in more than 50 percent of the cases, the announcements 
seem to have had a significantly positive effect on individual investment decisions in the 
public good. In addition to reaching a generally higher level of cooperation we also observed 
the overall degree of cooperation to be more stable during the experiment. In order to learn 
more about the individual investment decision we run the following fixed effects panel 
regression
16 
r , i r , i i
pub
r , i a x ε ω α + ⋅ + = , 
with ai,r being the announced investment in the public good in round r. The results are 
reported in table 11.  
ω 0.129 
T-value 1.26 
Significance  p > 0.10 
r
2 0.501 
Table 11: Individual investments and announcements 
 While we find a positive effect of individual announcements on the investment decisions 
towards the public good, this effect turns out to be insignificant. This finding might be due to 
the fact that the participants were more concerned with the aggregate announcement of the 





r , j i
pub
r , i a x ε ϕ α + ⋅ + = ∑
=
. 
                                                 
16  Due to the fact that Wilson and Sell (1997) run a simple OLS-regression with a common intercept the results 
can hardly be compared.    21
The results are reported in table 12. We find a significantly positive effect of the aggregate 
announcement of investments in the public good. Thus, the aggregate announcements have a 




Significance  p < 0.05 
r
2 0.516 
Table 12: Individual investments and aggregate announcements 
We already illustrated that participants in treatment 3 used the signalling mechanism quite 
often to cheat others by overstating their willingness to cooperate. The same finding made 
Wilson and Sell (1997) believe that cooperation can hardly evolve in such a climate. 
However, if attempts at cheating would in fact discourage groups one should expect that 
cooperative behaviour will quickly diminish in the course of time. We should at least be able 
to observe a declining round trend – a hypothesis we already tested earlier and which we had 
to reject. Thus, participants behaviour in treatment 3 indicates that cheating does not 
necessarily destroy cooperation. To study the participants’ reaction on observed differences 
between announced and factual investments in the previous round, we run the fixed effects 
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17  This finding partially contradicts the results of Wilson and Sell (1997) who find that individual behaviour is 
more related with the own announcements and the own past behaviour. We suggest that these findings are 
heavily influenced by the fact that they result from a regression with a common intercept. Such a regression fails 
to take the general differences of the participants with respect to cooperative behaviour into account. Whenever 
different types of participants (cooperative, non-cooperative) exist a regression with a common intercept is likely 
to find an autoregressive component in investment behaviour. We found no significant effect of past investment 
decisions on the current one when using a fixed effects model.   22
The results are shown in table 13. An F-Test shows that the predictive power of the latter 
model is significantly (at a confidence-level of 99 percent) increased by the inclusion of the 
difference between announced and factual investments as regressor (F
crit=6.93, F=9.09). We 
find a positive coefficient for π which is significant at the 90-percent-significance-level. One 
might find this result surprising since it implies that intense cheating in the previous round 
induces the participants to invest more tokens in the public good in the following round. Thus, 
cheating does not lead to decreasing cooperation but to attempts at restoring the common 
belief in future cooperation by increasing investments in the public good. Thus, participants in 
treatment 3 seem to have had an interest in keeping the signalling device of not-binding 
announcements in function in order to achieve a high degree of cooperation. This behaviour 
might serve as an explanation why we do not find a round trend in investments in the public 
good in treatment 3. 
Φ 0.112 
T-value 2.27 
Significance  p < 0.05 
π 0.078 
T-value 1.66 
Significance  p = 0.10 
r
2 0.531 
Table 13: Individual investments, aggregate announcements and cheating 
6 Conclusions 
In this paper we presented empirical evidence of cooperative behaviour in a series of public 
good experiments. While the participants’ behaviour in the control treatment is in line with   23
the stylized facts resulting from earlier studies, the participants in the two additional 
treatments differed significantly.  
Cooperative behaviour significantly increased and became more stable when the participants 
were asked to guess other participants’ contributions to the public good although the accuracy 
of these guesses had no direct influence on payoffs and although guesses were not 
communicated. We suggest that the advice of making guesses lead the players to intensifying 
their efforts in building an expectation on other participants’ behaviour and to react 
accordingly. 
Cooperative behaviour increased even more when participants had the possibility of making 
use of a strictly limited form of communication during the experiment. Although the 
announcements the participants made in the beginning of every round were not binding and 
the participants used the announcements for cheating purposes in more than 50 percent of all 
cases the average investment in the public good increased by more than 100 percent in 
comparison to the control treatment. We suggest that the stable and high degree of 
cooperation results from the participants’ perception that the signalling mechanism is a 
valuable means of increasing overall cooperation. 
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  Treatment 1  Treatment 2  Treatment 3 
Average investment rounds 1-9  2.40  3.13  5.09 
Average investment round 10  1.60  2.80  3.90 
Average rank rounds 1-9  51.04  51.00  51.35 
Average rank round 10  45.60  46.00  42.85 
Mann-Whitney  U  401.0 405.0 373.5 
Significance level  p > 0.1  p > 0.1  p > 0.1 
Table A1: Last round effects (Mann-Whitney rank-sum-test) 
 
 
  Treatment 1  Treatment 2  Treatment 3 
Average  investment  2.32 3.10 4.97 
Standard  deviation  2.73 2.70 4.05 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov-Z  2.026 1.643 2.000 
Significance level  
(distribution is normal) 
p > 0.1  p > 0.1  p > 0.1 
Table A2: Normal distribution test (Kolmogorov-Smirnov-test) 
 
 






mean(T2)>mean(T1)  18.94  4052.5  p < 0.05 
mean(T3)>mean(T1)  34.42  3279.5  p < 0.01 
mean(T3)>mean(T2)  26.31  3687.0  p < 0.01 
Table A3: Comparison of average investments  
(Mann-Whitney rank-sum-test)  
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